Muslims -mainly those often known as Rohingya-in Rakhine State are effectively stateless, having failed to attain any form of citizenship. 1 Campaigns against Muslims in Rakhine State, who make up around one third of the State's overall population of about 3.2 million, 2 have been described by Human Rights Watch as "ethnic cleansing". 3 In 2012, groups of local Rakhine activists razed communities to the ground in central districts of the State as part of a concerted effort to change the area's ethnic composition. Further violent clashes have been attributed to perpetrators from both the minority and majority communities, but reputable sources agree that the main aggressors were affiliated with Rakhine Buddhist networks. 4 Casualty figures are unreliable, but up to 1,000 people, the majority of them Muslim, are thought to have died in inter-communal violence during 2012. In two waves of attacks, most of the Muslims living in central parts of
Rakhine State were displaced from their communities into relocated to isolated camps. Their freedom of movement remained restricted after the violence subsided. In addressing the reasons behind ethnic conflicts, researchers have considered specific aspects of violence, focusing on identifiable political and social factors that can be observed across recent conflicts. Empirical studies suggest that the risk of violence is greater among populations with high levels of stratification along ethnic lines whereby certain ethnic groups are more privileged than others. Frances Stewart's work builds on earlier literature addressing multi-ethnic societies and finds that disparities between ethnic groups or "horizontal inequalities" increase the likelihood of conflict. 9 Michael Mann states that in areas inhabited by different ethnic groups, a high level of nationalism defined along ethnic lines tends to justify extreme standpoints, enable leaders to create scapegoats out of minorities and reduce the scope to manage inter-group tensions. Relatively recent and rapid transitions from authoritarian to democratic government create space for "ethnic entrepreneurs" to drum up and exploit group animosities. 10 Other assessments have considered at length the importance of government responses to local conflicts and the instrumental role of local politicians in provoking violence. 11 These sources draw on case studies from India, Indonesia and other multi-ethnic countries of Southeast Asia that share some similarities with Rakhine State.
Rather than isolating a single factor or theory, this article emphasizes the specific context of the case study, encompassing the multiple causes and complex interactions that lead to violent conflict. Any single incident of ethnic violence stems from an interplay of economic, social and political dynamics that lead to immediate actions and define underlying causes. 12 The aim is to avoid reducing a complex reality to a narrower set of factors that may further comparative analysis, but then risk obscuring the subtleties and contradictions of realworld situations.
The term "ethnicity" is employed here in the constructivist sense, recognizing that ethnic groups are socially created. Their ascribed properties and the boundaries between them are chiefly the result of human interaction. 13 Definitions of, and the boundaries between, ethnic groups are flexible, yet they often endure over many generations. This definition avoids a primordial sense of ethnicity, in which the term takes on a meaning far closer to that of the word "race", implying permanence grounded in physical difference or immutable cultural properties.
14 However, the widespread and persistent -even if inaccurate belief-that ethnic characteristics are somehow indelibly embedded in genes remains a significant factor in many societies. Ethnic identity is typically defined in Myanmar and across most of Southeast Asia in primordial terms, playing up the rights of a defined group of people (or a supposedly pure "race") to ancestral land. 15 State nationalism, and many independence movements, are built on a similar basis. 16 The term "race", or its equivalent in different languages, is still regularly used across Southeast Asia, for example on citizen identity cards.
The following sections explain how the violence in Rakhine State that flared up in 2012 can be linked both to broader trends across Myanmar and to the specific circumstances of the conflict-affected area. Information is presented under several subheadings: the historical roots of ethnic tensions; the minority status of both main groups of antagonists; recent political changes and their impact; local political processes; and international elements.
Historical Precedents, Ethnicity and Religious Nationalism
Recent violence in Myanmar builds on the past, including the legacy of colonialism. British imperial authority was gradually extended eastwards from India during the 19th century.
Many Indians -Muslims, Hindus and others-followed in the same direction, moving to towns and cities across Burma. The colonial civil service, the police and the army were largely staffed by Indians. 17 Largely as a legacy of this colonial history, contemporary Ethnic Rakhines were prominent in the fight against colonial authorities. They continued to challenge national leaders after independence and Rakhine ethnic armed groups maintained an insurgency for many decades. 29 Over time, this struggle increasingly shifted to focus on the concerns of the Muslim minority. The widespread belief that immigration and higher birth rates are rapidly increasing the Muslim population fed what has been described as a "siege mentality". 30 Many Rakhines fear becoming a minority within their own state, just as political reforms have finally generated opportunities to gain some authority over their own affairs. 31 Rakhine activists can point to separatist claims to territory made by Muslims in northern parts of the State, where Muslims comprise a majority of the population. These claims date back to the 1950s, when Rakhine separatists were also seeking territorial control.
The government of Myanmar suppressed both groups. 32 There is no evidence that any separatist group -or international terror cell-has existed in recent years within Muslim communities in Rakhine State, but the historical memory feeds current Rakhine fears and sustains propaganda. 33 Rising economic and political expectations have yet to be met. In addition to national level reforms and faster national economic growth, the recent exploitation of offshore natural gas near the Rakhine coastline has generated a major revenue stream for the national, and potentially local, government. 47 The gas is piped directly to China under a long-term concession, and local politicians want Rakhine State to see a share of the profits. 48 However, the national government did not concede to their demands and retained all of the proceeds.
Reflecting the long-term trend of Myanmar's national rulers and their business associates extracting profit from economic activity and offering meagre returns to the local population, 49 Rakhine businessmen and politicians showed little confidence that their marginal status would be redressed. Plans for industrial development in a new special economic zone near Kyaukphyu had not moved ahead. Even if the plans were to be realized, local entrepreneurs feared losing out to larger national companies. 50 This pattern had already been seen in Ngapali, a beach resort in southern Rakhine State, where local business leaders complained that they were overwhelmed by national and international investors. 51 Confidence in the rural economy of Rakhine State was low. Job creation and rising wages in central parts of Myanmar adversely affected local rice farmers and wholesalers.
Increased labour costs for harvesting and transportation meant that they struggled to compete with more efficient farms elsewhere in the country. 52 The fishing industry also suffered from mismanaged common resources. An unpopular quota system that gave influential operators The ANP alliance stood for the 2015 election on a ticket that stressed: "First, Arakan In early 2015, after protracted local protest whenever the issue of Muslim people's rights was raised, the government eventually decided to withdraw temporary citizenship status and in doing so disenfranchised around 700,000 people nationally. Most of these were Muslims in Rakhine State. 65 In addition, local Muslim-led candidates were barred by the Election Commission from standing for office. 66 These steps significantly boosted the ANP's chances of electoral success. With activists depicting them as an enemy, the UN and international agencies belatedly recognized that they had a serious image problem among the Rakhine population. 81 In March 2014, international aid agency offices in Sittwe were ransacked. The violence appeared to be carefully managed, prior warnings having enabled staff to leave before gangs of armed men arrived to destroy property, vehicles and supplies. 82 By sending a clear and aggressive signal without causing injury or death, the ringleaders were able to send an uncompromising message while avoiding a strong central government security crackdown and worldwide condemnation.
International efforts to safeguard human rights in Rakhine State and across Myanmar were commonly derided as an unwelcome attack on national sovereignty. 83 For decades, the military-led government had regularly depicted foreign interests as threats to national identity and territorial integrity. Efforts to discredit foreign agencies in Rakhine State were able to take advantage of this well-established national discourse. International isolation and the lack of rule-based domestic institutions meant that Rakhine activists were cynical of the notion that any institution acts according to principles of neutral humanitarianism.
International agencies gradually recognized that arguments over humanitarian need and global standards were ineffective. 84 The violence directed against their offices pushed international agency staff to consult Rakhine leaders and offers of long-term international development assistance for Rakhine communities then followed.
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Conclusions
Many of the key indicators identified in international research on the causes of ethnic conflict are found in Rakhine State. The concept of horizontal inequalities can be applied there on two levels: first between Muslims and ethnic Rakhines in Rakhine State; and second between ethnic Rakhines and Burmese nationally. 86 The significance of the government response to rising tensions is clearly seen. 87 Patterns of violence, in particular the roles of local politicians and networks in stimulating conflict, share common features with other instances of ethnic conflict across the region and more widely. criticizing its use by US diplomats. 92 The new government remained caught between different interests: military and security concerns; national chauvinist sentiments that discourage sympathetic treatment of Muslims; Rakhine claims for power and control of territory; and international concern over the plight of the state's Muslims. 93 This longstanding pattern, and the intensity of violence in 2012-13, supports the comparative observation made by Donald Horowitz that electoral systems which facilitate the formation of ethnic parties serve to help deepen and extend pre-existing ethnic conflict. The overall position of the central government has been ambiguous and human rights organizations have catalogued many laws and practices that discriminate against Muslims. 96 At the same time, the limited extent of local autonomy and continued lack of economic opportunities in Rakhine State generated strong reasons for ethnic Rakhines to regard the central government as an enemy rather than an ally.
These complex dynamics offer many opportunities for further research in Rakhine
State. If further power is devolved from the centre to states and regions in future years, then the actions of local politicians, their relationship with the central government, and the incentives that guide them will become even more important factors in determining the potential for violence. The scope for civil society bodies to reduce conflict tensions, an issue analysed in depth elsewhere [where? A reference would be good], is also of direct relevance to peace-builders in Rakhine State. 97 Understanding these local patterns and relating them to wider changes across Myanmar will provide useful insights for academics and policymakers.
Meanwhile, the lack of common ground over the rights to which Muslims in Rakhine State are entitled means that their plight looks set to endure for many more decades to come.
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